https://www.amazon.com/Bomber-Command-Zenith-Military-Classi...
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Bomber-Command-Pan-Military-Classic...https://www.amazon.com/Bomber-Command-Zenith-Military-Classi...The book talks about the change in tactics. At the beginning of the war targeting civilian areas was clearly a war crime; by the end of the war we had things like Dresden. > And because it had led the AAF to organize its raids during the day, when its bombers were easy for German fighter pilots to find and shoot down, casualties in the bomber force during 1942 and 1943 were shockingly high; in one raid alone, the October 14, 1943 attack on the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Raid_on_Schweinfurt), 26% of the attacking bombers were shot down. Most people don't understand just how high the casuality rates were. The RAF bomber command lost about 55,000 men of 125,000 total.
https://www.amazon.com/Bomber-Command-Zenith-Military-Classi...The book talks about the change in tactics. At the beginning of the war targeting civilian areas was clearly a war crime; by the end of the war we had things like Dresden. > And because it had led the AAF to organize its raids during the day, when its bombers were easy for German fighter pilots to find and shoot down, casualties in the bomber force during 1942 and 1943 were shockingly high; in one raid alone, the October 14, 1943 attack on the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Raid_on_Schweinfurt), 26% of the attacking bombers were shot down. Most people don't understand just how high the casuality rates were. The RAF bomber command lost about 55,000 men of 125,000 total.
The book talks about the change in tactics. At the beginning of the war targeting civilian areas was clearly a war crime; by the end of the war we had things like Dresden.
> And because it had led the AAF to organize its raids during the day, when its bombers were easy for German fighter pilots to find and shoot down, casualties in the bomber force during 1942 and 1943 were shockingly high; in one raid alone, the October 14, 1943 attack on the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Raid_on_Schweinfurt), 26% of the attacking bombers were shot down.
Most people don't understand just how high the casuality rates were. The RAF bomber command lost about 55,000 men of 125,000 total.
https://www.amazon.com/Bomber-Command-Zenith-Military-Classi...
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Bomber-Command-Pan-Military-Classic...
https://www.amazon.com/Bomber-Command-Zenith-Military-Classi...
The book talks about the change in tactics. At the beginning of the war targeting civilian areas was clearly a war crime; by the end of the war we had things like Dresden.
> And because it had led the AAF to organize its raids during the day, when its bombers were easy for German fighter pilots to find and shoot down, casualties in the bomber force during 1942 and 1943 were shockingly high; in one raid alone, the October 14, 1943 attack on the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Raid_on_Schweinfurt), 26% of the attacking bombers were shot down.
Most people don't understand just how high the casuality rates were. The RAF bomber command lost about 55,000 men of 125,000 total.