HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt
I’ll just leave this here.
>(1) and (3) are reforms, not a retaliation.
Reforms are what matter, not feel-good retaliation. Institutions aren't a hockey puck to pass around, they are vital and destroying them leads to collapse and its how democracies become dictatorships.
The way to fix institutions is to actually fix them, not hurt the other side so we can feel better about ourselves while we destroy the institutional foundations that are needed for the state to function.
>(2) likely involves court packing, just with a thin veneer.
It literally doesn't. You establish a completely neutral court and then the completely neutral court decides on all other members. It's literally impossible to pack that court since you always have the exact same number of votes on each side.
>(A) it does not. Otherwise tit-for-tat would not be an equilibrium strategy.
Tit-for-tat is also not a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy. FFS, the primary failure condition of tit for tat is literally called a death spiral. It makes a lot of assumptions that aren't true of the status quo. It is inherently contingent on escalation being symmetric to begin with (hence the "tit for tat"). When one side is willing to escalate disproportioantely, tit-for-tat doesn't work. It also inherently presupposes a cooperative opponent. Neither of these things is true about the GOP.
Instead when you escalate against an opponent who retaliates disproportionately, especially one unconcerned with cooperation, you just encourage a runaway effect. Especially when you are disproportionately escalating against such an opponent (and court packing would be a massively disproportionate escalation).
It's why escalation models don't begin and end at nuclear escalation. It's why we don't react to every Russian act of aggression by bombing Russian military bases.
>They have these tools already. At this point, escalation is not in their interests since they've already secured gains... but if the Democrats do not respond decisively when able, that impacts future Republican calculus wrt partisan aggression.
>(B) Again, preferable to a one sided conflict. I'd rather my side give as good as it gets in an all out brawl, rather than indefinitely accepting defeat in a moderate one.
Then have fun in your unitary one party state.
Man, if only an expert in the field had literally written a book about why this is a godawfully stupid strategy. . . Oh look, they did!